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INDIVIDUAL FARMERS AND LAND RENTING IN HUNGARY 
 
ABSTRACT 
This paper uses data from a survey of more than 1,400 farming households in Hungary 
to identify a set of profiles of farming households, which are active in the rental market and to 
estimate econometrically the impact of household characteristics, such as social, physical, and 
human capital, as well as regional and environmental characteristics on land rental activities.  
We show that the decision of farming households to lease in land is related to their land 
endowment, their access to capital assets, human capital variables such as age and education 
and their social capital.  Environmental factors are also important. 
 
1  INTRODUCTION 
Land reform and the creation of optimal land institutions has attracted renewed 
attention because of its importance in transition processes such as in China, Vietnam, South 
Africa, the former Soviet Union, and Central and Eastern Europe (Csaki and Nash, 1997; 
Mathijs and Swinnen, 1998; Swinnen, 1999) and because of new political pressure for land 
reforms in countries with highly unequal land distributions such as Zimbabwe and Brazil.  
New insights in the functioning of land markets and institutions have also induced renewed 
attention to land access as a poverty reducing tool (de Janvry et al., 2001).  In particular, the 
role of land rental markets has recently been re-emphasized as important for providing access 
to land for the poor and as an efficiency-enhancing institution in environments characterized 
by large uncertainties, such as countries in transition (Deininger and Binswanger, 2001; 
Swinnen 2001).  Yet, empirically, the importance of rental markets differs strongly between 
countries (Sadoulet et al., 2001). 
Existing models of rental markets often focus on sharecropping or on large landlord-
small tenant models (Bavermman and Stiglitz, 1982; Bradhan, 1989).  While these 
assumptions are relevant for parts of the developing world, they do not capture the essential 
characteristics of rental contracts elsewhere, and are therefore insufficient as a basis for 
explaining the variation in rental activities.  For example, land markets in transition countries 
are characterized by dispersed landownership by many rural and urban households who 
compete for the access to land with large-scale corporations.  Furthermore, existing models 
pay relatively little attention to property rights security. Yet, new research suggests that 
insecurity of property rights is a key constraint on land rental in Latin America (Macours et 
al., 2001).   
Our paper analyses the development of land rental markets in Hungary by explicitly 
incorporating transition characteristics of land ownership, land use, and rural market 
imperfections.  We use data from a survey of more than 1,400 farming households.  First, we 
describe some general characteristics of land use and ownership in Hungary.  Second, we 
present a conceptual framework to analyse the decision of farming households to participate 
in the land rental market.  Third, we describe profiles of farming households who act as a 
tenant or landlord in the Hungarian land market.  The fourth section describes how regions 
with a high percentage of farming households who participate in the land rental market differ 
from regions where this percentage is low.  Finally, we estimate econometrically the impact 
of household characteristics, such as social, physical, and human capital, as well as regional 
and environmental characteristics on land rental activities. 
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2  THE HUNGARIAN LAND MARKET 
Under the communist regime, three types of organizations dominated Hungarian 
agriculture: collective farms, state farms and household plots.  Their share in land use was 
estimated respectively at 57%, 31% and 12%.  Farm land ownership was distributed as 
follows: the collective farms owned 42%, the members of the collective farms 24%, the state 
owned 27% and other private owners held 7% of productive land (European Commission, 
1998).  
Even under the communist regime, about 35% of the land cultivated by collective farms 
was still privately owned by farm members (Mathijs and Mészáros, 1997). Yet, they had very 
little effective rights.  The 1990s land restitution process allowed these collective farm 
members to withdraw freely the land that they formally owned.  However, since the land has 
been improved by land consolidation and investments by the collective farms, members could 
only withdraw a share of their land.   
Former landowners who had lost legal rights on their land were compensated for their 
losses.  People eligible for compensation were farmers whose land was seized just after 
Second World War and farmers who were forced to sell their land to the collective farm for a 
low price in the 1970s and 1980s.  Former owners (or their descendants) who claimed 
compensation received vouchers based on the estimated value of their lost property.  About 
2.5 million hectares of collective land and 0.2 million hectares of state owned land were 
privatised through voucher-based auctions.  The remaining land from the collective farms was 
allocated to their members, but registration of these is proceeding very slowly (European 
Commission, 1998). 
The land cultivated by the state farms was not subject to privatisation and became the 
responsibility of the State Property Agency.  They allocated the land as follows: 40 % was 
used for compensation of private persons, 37 % is used by companies which remain state 
property, 27 % was leased (mainly to former state farms) and 6 % was allocated to employees 
of state farms (Mathijs and Mészáros, 1997). 
These land reforms and the restructuring of the farms generated important changes in 
land ownership and use.  By 1995, the state still owned 20% of the farmland, co-operative 
members owned 33% and other private owners 48%.  The land use distribution among the 
main farm types was as follows: 28% of the land is used by about 4,300 private farming 
corporations, 24% by about 2,100 co-operatives and 48% by about 1,200,000 private 
individual farms (European Commission, 1998).   
The land reform process resulted in many new landowners who do not use (all) their 
land.  Land selling is not widespread in Hungary.  In contrast, the land rental market is very 
active.  A considerable part of the land rental activities are by large-scale farms such as 
corporations and cooperatives.  Part of this is mainly cooperatives leasing land from their 
members. 
In this paper we focus on the activities of individual farms in the rental market.  We 
analyse which characteristics determine whether certain farming households lease in or lease 
out land. 
 
3  CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK 
Our analysis of the determinants of participation in the lease market is based on 
theoretical models where households maximize their utility derived from income and leisure 
(Carter and Salgado, 2001; Sadoulet et al. 2001; Skoufias, 1995; Yao, 2000).  Some key 
assumptions underlying these models are imperfections in the labour, land and credit market, 
heterogeneity in the distribution of initial wealth and specific human capital, and rationing of   4
off-farm labour opportunities.  The assumption of labour market imperfections is related with 
moral hazards in hired labour: supervision of workers is required so that the effective labour 
supplied by hired workers depends on the amount of family labour working on the farm as 
well as the area of land cultivated.  Land market imperfections are assumed because of the 
presence of transaction costs, such as search costs and costs related to negotiating the terms of 
the tenure contract.  Hence, the models incorporate that effective rent paid is larger than the 
effective rent received.  If the credit market is imperfect, a farmer may not borrow against 
future profits so that the loan he can get depends on the amount of land in his possession.  
Consequently, the available working capital is constrained by the farmers’ initial wealth 
status, the land area that the farming household owns, the income from wage labour and the 
payments received from renting out their land.  The assumptions of households’ heterogeneity 
and rationed off-farm employment opportunities are incorporated in the models by allowing 
that the wage paid to hired labourers differs from the wage the household members can gain 
off farm.   
These theoretical models yield several hypotheses.  A first set of factors affecting 
participation in the lease market are variables which determine the management capabilities 
of the farming household.  Human capital variables as well as the labour endowment will 
affect the household’s ability to manage more land and, ceteris paribus, are therefore likely to 
have a positive impact on leasing. 
Second, in the presence of capital constraints, the size of the operated land area will be 
affected by household asset endowments and initial wealth.  More wealthy households are 
less liquidity constrained so that they have more working capital at their disposal and hence 
they can increase their operated farm size via rental.  In other words, increasing the operated 
size by leasing in land will only be useful if the household has enough machinery and land to 
access credit or enough initial wealth so that the necessary working capital can be provided.  
On the other hand, if there are economies of scale in production, e.g. due to imperfect 
markets, there exists an optimal operational farm size so that the probability of leasing in 
(out) land may decrease (increase) with the farmer’s land endowment.   
Next, environmental factors have an effect on the rental behaviour of farming 
households through their influence on the magnitude of transaction costs in the rental market.  
In addition, environmental factors may strengthen the consequences of imperfections in other 
factor markets and in that sense they are expected to have also an indirect impact on the 
farmers’ decision to participate in the lease market.  
 
4  PROFILES OF TENANTS AND LANDLORDS IN HUNGARY 
The data used in this paper originate from two sources.  On the one hand, we use 
county-level information from the statistical yearbook of Hungary (Hungarian Central 
Statistical Office).  On the other hand, we use data derived from a representative survey of 
Hungarian family farms carried out in 1998 collecting data for 1997
1.  The data sets contain 
detailed information on production structure, labour, land and other input use, capital, non-
agricultural activities, investments, credits and external conditions of 1,618 family farms.  A 
review of the data revealed some errors and farms for which errors could not be resolved were 
dropped so that we ended up with a sample of 1,469 family farms.   
Only a small share of the individual farmers (IFs), namely 8 %, adjusts their operated 
farm size by leasing in land.  The percentage of IFs leasing out land is twice as high (16%).  
                                                 
1 These data were collected in the framework of EU Phare ACE project P96-6090-R coordinated by Erik Mathijs 
of the KULeuven and Alexander Sarris of the University of Athens. The Hungarian survey was coordinated by 
Tibor Ferenczi, Budapest University of Economic Sciences.   5
Very few IFs are both leasing in and out land so that only a quarter of the Hungarian IFs are 
involved in the land rental market.  There are regional variations in the incidence of leases 
(see further). We first identify some “profiles” of tenants and landlords.  
 
4.1  Profiles of “Tenants” 
In order to shape a picture of IFs who lease in land, we created four different classes of 
tenants, which we compared with a reference group that embraces those farmers who are not 
leasing in land, i.e. the non-tenants.  The other classes are formed based upon the amount of 
land leased in.  The first class comprises farmers leasing in 0.5 hectare or less, the second 
class consists of farmers leasing in 0.5- 1 hectare, the third group contains farmers leasing in 
1- 10 hectares and the fourth class contains farmers leasing in more than 10 hectares.   
Class 1 covers 22% of the tenants and consists of farmers whose household income 
sources stem mainly from pensions and wage employment (respectively 41% and 40 %), 
while the share of income coming from own farming activities is small (only 14%).  In class 
2, we find 22% of all tenants and their main income source stems from wage employment 
(43%).  Own farming activities as well as pensions provide each approximately one quarter of 
the household income.  Class 3 with 34% of the tenants as well as class 4 with 23% contain 
farming households whose main income source originates from own farming activities, 
respectively 44% and 66%.   
Besides the source of household income, the tenants also differ in human capital 
variables.  The oldest farmers can be found in class 1, while the youngest can be found among 
the IFs of class 2.  Further, the number of years of schooling received by the household head 
increases with the amount of land leased in. 
The capital and land endowment varies considerably among the tenant groups.  The 
index of machinery ownership
2 and the percentage of households owning machinery 
increases with the amount of land leased in, while the amount of buildings owned remains 
more or less stable among all categories as indicated by the building index
3.  The IFs of class 
3 and 4 cultivate much larger parcels (respectively 12 ha and 79 ha) than those of class 1 and 
2.  The pattern of land endowment among the tenure categories is as follows: the non-tenants 
own on average 5 hectare, the tenants leasing in less than 1 hectare (class 1 and 2) own less 
land (respectively 1 and 4 hectares) than the non-tenants, while the tenants leasing in more 
than 1 hectare (class 3 and 4) own more land than the non-tenants (respectively 9 and 27 
hectares).  So, large parcels of land are leased in only if the farmer himself owns a 
considerable amount of land.  Interestingly, tenants of class 3 and 4 bought respectively 4 
hectares and 15 hectares of land which corresponds to more than 30 % of the land they own.  
Non-tenants bought on average 2 hectares of land, while the farming households belonging to 
class 1 and 2 bought on average less than 0.5 hectare which is less than 16% of the land they 
own.  Hence, purchasing land and renting land seem to be complementary activities.  On the 
other hand, the share of land owned before 1990 is negatively related with the amount of land 
leased in.  Further, it is worth mentioning that none of the IFs leasing in less than 0.5 hectare 
(class 1) received land under the compensation program.  This means that their land has never 
been confiscated or that they used their compensation vouchers for other purposes than 
acquiring land.  Given the age structure of the tenants of class 1 (they are on average 57 years 
                                                 
2 The machinery index is measured as a weighted index of household ownership of machinery and equipment 
items with the following weights: truck =1, tractor =1, cultivator =1, combine for cereals =1, feed combine =1, 
sowing machine =1, spraying equipment =1, milk processor =1, grape press =1. 
3 The building index is an unweighted index of the availability of six building items (cattle stables, pig houses, 
poultry houses, sheep shelters, storage facilities, and fixed greenhouses).   6
old), it is not unlikely that some of them did receive compensation vouchers but that they 
used them to claim for example a life-annuity rather than to buy land.   
Furthermore, the share of households of which at least one person is member of a co-
operative or partner of a farming corporation is considerably larger among the group of 
tenants than among the non-tenants.  This may suggest that external relations of IFs with 
farming corporations and cooperatives increase the social network, which makes it easier to 
lease in land (for example from persons also related to that agricultural enterprise).   
Finally, table 1 provides some information on the income status of IFs.  Figures on 
expenditures per capita and the share of food expenditures in total household expenditures 
suggest that the poorest farmers can be found among the tenants leasing in less than 0.5 
hectare, while the IFs who lease in more than 10 hectare form the wealthiest group.   
Based on the description of the tenants we can assign some labels to the different tenant 
classes.  Older farmers whose main income source stems from pensions can be found in class 
1 so that the name pensioned farmers seems to be appropriate.  In class 2, we find the 
youngest IFs whose main income source stems from wage employment and hence we name 
them the part-time tenants.  In class 3 and 4 we find IFs whose main income source stem 
from own farming activities.  Therefore we assign to both classes the name full-time tenants, 
but make a distinction based on the average operated farm size and their endowment: IFs of 
class 3 are called small full-time tenants, while class 4 gets the label large full-time tenants. 
So, we can conclude that more educated and younger farmers can be found among the 
part-time and full-time tenants, while non-tenants and pensioned tenants, who lease in a very 
small amount of land, are older and less educated.  Concerning the source of own land, full 
time tenants bought most of the land they own while non-tenants, pensioned and part-time 
tenants hold mainly land that was already in their possession before the transition period.  
Farmers leasing in more than one hectare of land seem to be more dynamic: they bought a 
considerable share of the land.  They own and further adjust their farm size through leasing so 
that they cultivate a rather large amount of land.  They own more machinery, have more 
access to machinery services and a larger part of them has some family link to a farming 
corporation or a cooperative.  Consequently, it is not surprising that they form the wealthiest 
group of farmers.  On the other hand the pensioned tenants and the part-time tenants own also 
more machinery than the non-tenants and a large part of them has access to machinery 
through services, but the amount of land they own is smaller.  The poorest households can be 
found among the farmers who lease in less than one hectare.  Although farming is not their 
main way of making a living, it is probably important for them to gain some extra money by 
farming and consequently to be able to lease in some land (even if this amount is very small).  
 
4.2  Profile of “landlords” 
When taking a closer look at the IFs who lease out land – we call them landlords-, it 
turned out to be appropriate to create two categories of landlords.  The first class (90%) 
embraces IFs that lease out less than 10 hectare, while the second class (10%) includes those 
IFs who rent out more than 10 hectares of agricultural land (see table 2).  Again those IFs 
who are not leasing out land act as a reference group and are called the owner-operators.   
The main income source of landlords and owner-operators stems from pensions (at 
least 40%). Own farming activities provide less than 21% of the household income and are 
the least important income source. 
A first distinguishing factor among the landlord classes can be found among the human 
capital variables.  On the one hand, the age structure differs: landlords are older than the 
owner-operators (59 versus 54 years old).  Education does not differ among landlord classes 
in terms of years, but the type of education varies.  The share of household heads that   7
received agricultural education is smaller among landlords than among owner-operators (4% 
versus 10%).   
In terms of cultivated land area, the smallest IFs can be found in class 1: they cultivate 
on average 2 hectares of land.  The owner-operators cultivate 6 hectares and the IFs who 
lease out more than 10 hectares have the largest operational size (10 hectares).  The amount 
of land owned hardly differs between the owner-operators and the IFs of class 1, while the 
IFs of class 2 own considerably more land.  This reflects that the amount of land leased out 
depends mainly on land endowment of the farming household.  When the amount of owned 
land is large, the farming household may have an excess of land compared to their 
endowment of other production factors and hence more land is leased out.   
Not only the amount of owned land differs among landlord classes, also the way they 
got possession of their land varies.  Almost half of the land in possession of the owner-
operators was already owned before the transition period.  Landlords of class 1 received 40% 
(on average 2 hectares) of their land under the restitution programme.  Most of the recipients 
of restituted land were able to hold their land title because they stayed active on the collective 
farm.  However borders were often not clear defined so that it was difficult to withdraw land 
and hence leasing out the land to the successor organisation was a very common option for 
the recipients of restituted land.  Landlords leasing out more than 10 hectares received on 
average 5 hectares under the restitution programme and 11 hectares under the compensation 
programme.  Problems in land entitlement combined with the fact that the IFs of class 2 own 
a large land area may induce these IFs to lease out land to the large- scale successor 
organisations of collective and state farms: almost 80% of the IFs landlords of class 2 leases 
out on average 15 hectares to a farming corporations or cooperative.  Considering the manner 
that landlords got hold of their land, it is not surprising that 50% of the landlords are member 
of a cooperative or partner of a company.   
Farming households leasing out less than 10 hectares (class 1) are the least endowed in 
capital assets.  This can be concluded based on the machinery index.  In contrast, landlords of 
class 2 are rather well endowed: they own on average more machinery than the owner-
operators and the IFs of class 1.   
Finally, figures on total expenditures per household member and the share of food 
expenditures in total expenditures show that the wealthiest IFs can be found among the 
landlords of class 2, while the figures are not conclusive when comparing the wealth status of 
the IFs of class 1 and the owner-operators. 
 
5  REGIONAL VARIATIONS 
The survey data show that regions with a high percentage of IFs participating in the 
land lease market can be found mainly in north-east Hungary, while regions with a small 
percentage of farming households who are active in the land rental market are spread around 
the country.  In table 3 we compare the characteristics of regions where a small share of the 
IFs (less than 5%) are leasing in land with those where the percentage of IFs who are leasing 
in land is larger than 10%.  Both types of regions are then compared with the total sample.  
Next, the same comparison is made based on the share of farming households who are leasing 
out land.  Regions with the lowest (less than 10%) and the highest (more than 24%) 
percentage of IFs who are leasing out land are grouped and their characteristics are compared.   
First, the average amount of land cultivated and owned by IFs is considerably smaller in 
the counties where less farming households are leasing in land.  In these regions, we find not 
only less tenants, also the average amount of land leased in is very small.  Further, table 3 
illustrates that the average land quality, as reported by the IFs, is significantly lower in these 
regions where less IFs are leasing in land, despite the fact that official statistics indicate that   8
this difference in land quality between counties with a high and low incidence of tenants is 
smaller.  Yet, in counties where less than 5% of the IFs are leasing in land, the quality of the 
land cultivated by the IFs is only 83% of the county average.  This is an indication that in 
these counties, the most fertile and productive land is still cultivated by farming corporations 
and cooperatives, while IFs are at a disadvantage.  This means that in some counties the 
transformation process was in favour of the large-scale successor organizations and individual 
farmers still don’t have access to the most productive land within their county.   
Farming corporations and cooperatives still cultivate on average 79% of the agricultural 
land within the counties where the incidence of tenants is low.  In these regions, the 
percentage of IFs who are member of a cooperative or partner of a farming corporation is also 
very low.  This may indicate that members or partners of large-scale farms face high exit cost 
and are discouraged to start up an individual farm so that the land is still cultivated by the 
large-scale successor organisation.  If only a small percentage of the households who run an 
individual are linked with a farming corporation or a cooperative, then the social capital of the 
IFs is limited so that it is more difficult to find a landlord from who they can lease in land. 
In counties where the incidence of tenants is small, the land price adjusted for land 
quality is also lower.  If leasing in land is a second best option to buying, then IFs may prefer 
to buy land instead of leasing when land sales prices are low. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that in counties where more than 10% of the IFs are 
leasing in land, we observe a lower unemployment rate.  More employment opportunities 
make that less productive landowners seek wage employment instead of running an individual 
farm.  Hence, more land will be available for leasing.  
If we group regions based on the share of IFs who are leasing out land, we observe only 
a few differences between regions with a high and low percentage of IFs who are leasing out 
land.  The average amount of land leased out is larger and the average land quality is rather 
high when more IFs act a landlord.  Further, the share of IFs who are linked with a farming 
corporation or a cooperative is also larger and most of the IFs lease out their land to a large-
scale successor organisation.  In regions with good farming conditions such as high land 
quality, members or partners of large-scale farms are more inclined to start up an individual 
farm so that more members or partner can be found among the IFs.  In these regions, 
beneficiaries of the compensation program will also be motivated to use their vouchers to buy 
agricultural land because the high productive value generates more (present and future) 
benefits.  However, if the land endowment does not correspond to the present endowment of 
other production factor, these new landowners will lease out part of the land they.  
 
6  ECONOMETRIC ANALYSIS 
In this section we compliment the profile analysis by a formal econometric model.  The 
dependent variable in regression A is the amount of land leased in, in regression B the amount 
of land leased out.  Since the amount of land leased is censored at zero, we use a tobit 
regression. 
The econometric model includes variables measuring human capital and physical 
capital, as well as a set of additional factors discussed above.  The estimated model is a two-
stage regression approach since the variables for machinery ownership are likely to be 
endogenous.  For a detailed discussion of the model and the variables, we refer to Vranken 
and Swinnen (2002).  Here we only present the key estimation results (see table 4) and the 
key conclusions.  These are as follows. 
First, the econometric analysis confirms that the management capability of the 
household is important.  Younger and higher educated farmers lease in more land.  Further, 
larger households (in terms of adult household members) lease in more land. This may be   9
because on the one hand, more labour is available and, on the other hand, moral hazard 
problems are reduced when more family members can provide labour on the farm.   
Nevertheless, time constraints and off-farm employment opportunities limit the amount of 
land leased in.  When the share of the household’s income received by wage employment 
increases, less land is leased in.  This may be due to higher labour opportunity costs or to risk 
diversification at the household level. 
The amount of land leased in is positively correlated with the likelihood that the 
household has also purchased land - which is consistent with our previous conclusion that 
buying and leasing of are complementary strategies.  This may also reflect market 
imperfections as farms may see leasing as a second best option to buying.   
Yet the amount of land leased in is smaller for households which own more land, ceteris 
paribus.  Presumably this reflects the simple affect that households who own more land need 
to lease less. 
Next, the households’ capital asset endowment is important.  Imperfections in the credit 
market matter.  Ownership of machinery and access to machinery have a significantly 
positive effect on the amount of land leased in.   
The land sales price (adjusted for land quality) has a significant positive effect on 
leasing.  High land sales prices make it difficult to adjust operational farm sizes through 
buying agricultural land.  Hence, leasing becomes an important alternative to adjust farmers’ 
land holdings.   
To what extent corporate farms dominate the use of agricultural land in a county has 
also an impact on the leasing behaviour of IFs.  If the share of agricultural land cultivated by 
corporate farms is larger than 90%, then significantly less land is leased in by IFs.  In those 
regions corporate farms and cooperatives dominate the land market to such an extent that very 
little land is available for IFs to lease in.  Moreover, in areas with less leasing activities 
among IFs, the quality of the land cultivated by IFs is on average 20% smaller than the 
county average and only very few IFs are related with a corporate farms in these regions.  
These results suggest that when corporate farms dominate the land market, they tend to 
discourage private farming and to constrain land rental activities.  
Finally, to capture some fixed effects, we introduced regional dummies, which indicate 
that the amount of land leased in is significantly smaller in southern and eastern Hungary 
compared to central Hungary. 
The regression results with the amount of land leased out as dependent variable show 
that significantly more land is leased out by older IFs.  On the one hand, older individuals 
might not be physically capable to farm the land them selves and on the other hand, they 
might be less motivated to cultivate the land they own since they receive income from 
pensions.   
Rural households with a larger land endowment have the intention to lease out more 
agricultural land.  Landowners with an excess of land given their endowment in family labour 
and capital assets can choose between renting out land or cultivating it them selves using 
hired labour.  Imperfections in the labour market (moral hazard problems) and other factor 
markets (e.g. in the credit market so that limited access to credit prohibits the purchase of 
capital assets to cultivate the land them selves) will lead to a landowners’ decision to lease out 
part of the land he possesses. 
Farmers who received land under the compensation program are more likely to lease 
out land.  This reflects the fact that most land is coming from the compensation programme- 
see also table 2.  
Access to machinery services and machinery endowment of rural households is 
negatively correlated with the amount of land leased – which is consistent with the results in 
regression A.     10
Finally regional variables indicate that in western Hungary more land is leased out.  
This may be related with the proximity of Austria.  Austrian farmers may are interested in 
leasing in land from Hungarian rural households living close to the border.  As a result the 
demand for land increases which drives up the rental price and more rural households will 
consider leasing out land to be more beneficial than cultivating the land them selves. 
 
7  CONCLUSION 
In this paper we have studied which factors determine whether individual farmers will 
participate in the Hungarian land rental market.  We first describe a set of profiles of tenants 
and landlords as well as regional variations in the incidence of leasing.  Next, we used an 
econometric model to find the determinants of a households’ land leasing behaviour. 
First, individual farmers’ decision to lease land is related with their land endowment.  
The probability to lease in (out) land decreases (increases) with the amount of land owned.  
The amount of land leased is positively correlated with the likelihood that the household has 
purchased land, while the amount of land leased out is correlated with the likelihood of 
receiving land under the restitution or compensation program.  Further, the leasing behaviour 
is correlated with the endowment of capital assets or access to certain capital assets which is 
probably caused by the presence of credit market imperfections.  Human capital variables 
such as age and education affect the household’s capabilities to run an individual farm and 
hence it has an impact on the leasing behaviour.  Social capital such as family links with a 
farming corporation or cooperative affect the leasing behaviour of individual farmers because 
it affects the probability of and search costs to find a leasing partner.  Further, environmental 
factors are important.  Regions characterized by a low percentage of farming households who 
are leasing in land are typically areas with a high unemployment level, low land sales prices 
(adjusted for land quality), small land endowments of farming households and with larger 
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Table 1: Profiles of tenants 
 Non-tenants  Class  1 
0 <leased in ≤0.5 
Class 2 
0.5 <leased in ≤ 1.0 
Class 3 
1.0 <leased in≤ 10.0 
Class 4 
10.0<leased in 
Share of total sample  92 %  2 %  2 %  3 %  2 % 
Share of tenants  -  22 %  22 %  34 %  23 % 
Age of household head (years)  55  57  48  49  50 
Education of household head (years)  9  9  10  11  13 
Machinery index  0.3  0.4  0.6  1.0  3.0 
Share of households owning machinery  24  42  42  61  88 
Share of households with access to machinery services  43  54  77  71  78 
Building index  2.2  2.2  2.5  2.8  2.4 
Cultivated land area  4  1  4  12  79 
Land endowment (ha)  4  1  4  9  27 
Source of own land (ha)           
  Owned before 1990  0.5  0.4  1.3  0.9  0.6 
  Received under the restitution programme 0.8  0.5 0.6  0.8  4.8 
  Received under compensation programme 1.4  0.0 1.7  1.5  6.3 
  Bought  1.7  0.1  0.2  4.3  14.8 
Source of own land (%)           
  Owned before 1990  43  43  34  28  12 
  Received under the restitution programme  18  17  25  20  27 
  Received under compensation programme  15  0  24  10  20 
  Bought  12  16  7  30  35 
Share of households leasing from farming corporations and cooperatives  0  62  31  20  11 
Share of households leasing from individuals  0  38  69  88  89 
Land leased from farming corporations and cooperatives  0  0.2  0.3  0.4  6 
Land leased from individuals  0  0.1  0.6  3  43 
Member of coop/partner of comp (%)  19  23  31  27  30 
Total expenditures per household member  180  150  177  177  200 
Share of food expenditures in total expenditures (%)  52  57  51  49  51 
Source of household income (%)           
  Wage employment  36  40  43  32  19 
  Own farming activities  15  14  27  44  66 
  Pensions  43  41  26  19  9 
Type of tenant    Pensioned tenant  Part-time tenant  Small full-time tenants Large full-time 
tenants 
Source: Own calculations   13 
Table 2: Profiles of landlords 
 Owner-operators  Class  1 
0 < leased out ≤ 10.0 
Class 2 
10.0 < leased out 
Share of total sample  84   15  2 
Share of landlords  -  90  10 
Age of household head (years)  54  59  59 
Education of household head (years)  9  9  10 
Percentage of household heads received agr educ  9  4  4 
Machinery index  0.4  0.2  0.6 
Share of households owning machinery  28  17  46 
Share of households with access to machinery services  46  39  58 
Building index  2.2  2.2  2.7 
Cultivated Land Area (ha)  6  2  10 
Land endowment (ha)  5  4  28 
Source of own land (ha)       
  Owned before 1990  0.4  0.6  7.0 
  Received under the restitution programme  0.7 1.5  4.7 
  Received under compensation programme  1.4  0.8  11.4 
  Bought  2.2  0.9  2.9 
Source of own land (%)       
  Owned before 1990  46  22  12 
  Received under the restitution programme  14  40  20 
  Received under compensation programme  13  17  51 
  Bought  14  5  6 
Share of households leasing to farming corporations and cooperatives  0  83  79 
Share of households leasing to individuals  0  18  29 
Land leased to farming corporations and cooperatives  0  3  15 
Land leased to individuals  0  0  4 
Member of coop/partner of comp (%)  14  48  46 
Total expenditures per household member  180  194  255 
Share of food expenditures in total expenditures (%)  52  51  43 
Source of household income (%)       
  Wage employment  36  33  24 
  Own farming activities  18  11  21 
  Pensions  40  50  45 
Source: Own calculations   14 
Table 3: Regional differences 
 Total  sample  Share of IFs leasing IN ≤ 5%  10% ≤ Share of IFs leasing IN 
Land cultivated (ha)  5  2  8 
Owned land (ha)  5  4  7 
Average amount of land leased in (ha)  13  1  17 
Average amount of land leased out (ha)  5  6  5 
Share of households leasing in  8  2  13 
Share of households leasing out  16  8  16 
Land quality reported by households (source: survey data)  20  15  20 
Land quality at county level (source: national statistics)  20  18  20 
Ratio quality reported by households over county-level quality  99  87  100 
Share of agricultural land cultivated by corporate farm  65  79  53 
Share of households member of cooperative or partner of farming corporation  19  9  23 
Land price adjusted for quality  163  140  175 
Unemployment rate  9  9  6 
Share of households leasing from farming corporations and cooperatives  15  1  4 
Share of households leasing from individuals  6  2  10 
Share of households leasing to farming corporations and cooperatives  14  5  13 
Share of households leasing to individuals  3  3  3 
 
 Total  sample  Share of IFs leasing OUT ≤ 10%  24% ≤ Share of IFs leasing OUT 
Land cultivated (ha)  5  5  8 
Owned land (ha)  5  5  6 
Average amount of land leased in (ha)  13  10  27 
Average amount of land leased out (ha)  5  4  5 
Share of households leasing in  8  8  10 
Share of households leasing out  16  6  26 
Land quality reported by households (source: survey data)  20  18  25 
Land quality at county level (source: national statistics)  20  18  25 
Ratio quality reported by households over county-level quality  99  101  100 
Share of agricultural land cultivated by corporate farm  65  61  55 
Share of households member of cooperative or partner of farming corporation  19  16  25 
Land price adjusted for quality  163  167  165 
Unemployment rate  9  9  8 
Share of households leasing from farming corporations and cooperatives  15  2  3 
Share of households leasing from individuals  6  6  9 
Share of households leasing to farming corporations and cooperatives  14  4  24 
Share of households leasing to individuals  3  2  1 
Source: Own calculations 
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Table 4: Regression results 
Regression A: Tobit amount of land leased in as dependant variable  Coefficient  P-value 
Age household head  ***-0.346  0.03 
Education household head  **0.926  0.015 
Adult household members  ***5.458  0.000 
Source of household income coming from wage employment  ***-0.139  0.000 
Owned land area  ***-0.770  0.000 
Bought land (dummy)  *4.815  0.092 
Compensation (dummy)  -4.480  0.148 
Owned land before 1990 (dummy)  -3.630  0.139 
Access to machinery services (dummy)  ***9.643  0.000 
Estimated machinery index  ***56.824  0.000 
Land quality at county level  -0.101  0.734 
Land price adjusted for land quality  ***0.202  0.002 
Regional land use by farming corporations and cooperatives  **-10.248  0.040 
Eastern Hungary  ***-9.152  0.006 
Western Hungary  0.168  0.961 
Southern Hungary  **-8.949  0.027 
Intercept ***-81.254  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared    0.20 
Number of Observations    1469 
 
Regression B: Tobit amount of land leased out as dependent varible  Coefficient  P-value 
Age household head  ***0.143  0.001 
Education household head  0.121  0.121 
Adult household members  0.258  0.258 
Source of household income coming from wage employment  0.004  0.748 
Owned land area  **0.063  0.036 
Bought land (dummy)  -1.164  0.319 
Compensation (dummy)  ***4.165  0.000 
Owned land before 1990 (dummy)  *1.569  0.060 
Access to machinery services (dummy)  *-1.519  0.063 
Estimated machinery index  *-3.539  0.099 
Land quality at county level  **0.193  0.040 
Land price adjusted for land quality  0.020  0.291 
Regional land use by farming corporations and cooperatives  -1.417  0.295 
Eastern Hungary  0.714  0.503 
Western Hungary  ***3.151  0.006 
Southern Hungary  1.522  0.256 
Intercept ***-27.816  0.000 
Pseudo R-squared    0.03 
Number of observations    1469 
 
 